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Introduction
Governments across the world appreciate the need for checks on 
the transfer or exportation of  commodities, information, soft-
ware, and technology considered of  strategic value. Items are 
viewed as deserving of  control if  they touch on issues national 
security and defense. In some cases however, products that have 
critical economic value or border on foreign policy are put into 
the category of  sensitive commodities that are controlled. For 
such reasons, extensive networks, laws and regulations are devised 
to ensure that the transfer or trade in sensitive/dual-use items is 
under scrutiny. Precisely, export controls are regulations on ship-
ment and transfer of  strategic/controlled items. In practice, non-
compliance attracts severe penalties. Thus, parties which trade in 
such commodities must acquire licenses, and operate as specified 
by the existing guidelines. The current paper assesses export con-
trols in the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.
In order to control exports, countries rely on laws, treaties, inter-
national arrangements and other related instruments. In the cur-
rent case, the UAE is largely dependent on Federal Law No. 12 of  
2008 while the UK depends on the Export Control Act of  2002. 
It is established that the legislations enact amendments to reflect 
the dynamic nature of  the state environment. However, the entry 
into international arrangements supports the view that the fight 
against trading in dual-use, military, or sensitive products require 
cooperative efforts from state parties in order to attain success. 
Export Controls in the UAE
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been late in as far as coop-
erating with the international community on the issue of  Export 
Control. The UAE had the widest gap between commitment and 
compliance on nonproliferation export control [1]. Such checks 
reflect national restrictions that governments impose regarding 
the exportation of  sensitive technologies and goods. In particular, 
focus is paid to dual-use goods or arms. It was not until 2007 that 
the UAE set in place a law to guide the export of  such items. Stin-
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nett, Early, Horne and Karreth noted that the country lacked even 
an institutional framework to oversee the trade [2]. In the face of  
the prevailing circumstances, it was possible for other states to 
exploit the UAE by labeling it an illicit proliferation front. For 
example, Early remarked that owing to the existing gap, Iran was 
able to station intermediaries in the country for use in the acqui-
sition of  sensitive products yet it was facing sanctions at the in-
ternational scene [2]. The recent commitments by the UAE have 
however signaled the country’s commitment to the adoption of  
controls necessary for it to be allowed to carry on its nuclear en-
ergy project.
The obligations of  the UAE to adopt an effective export control 
systems rests on the role played by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) in its pursuit of  encouraging voluntary commit-
ment [3]. Bergenäs noted that in 2004, the United Nations passed 
Resolution 1540 paving the way for the creation of  a universal 
obligation that binds all states to establish export control frame-
works [4]. In 2008, the UNSC barred countries from trading in 
sensitive items with Iran. In 2008, the UAE committed to the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group’s Export Guidelines on sensitive ma-
terials. In this regard, the country was committing to contribute 
towards efforts that improve peace and international security by 
limiting the proliferation of  arms or material for the manufacture 
of  harmful products.
When evaluating the nation’s export control system, reference is 
made to three major dimensions: the legal framework, the level of  
institutionalization and implementation. The degree of  the legal 
development in a state’s control organization is assessed based on 
the comprehensiveness of  the export control laws in terms of  
how they restrict the flow of  commodities, transaction types that 
are disallowed, the type of  body set up to enforce the guidelines 
and the punitive measures attached to the violation of  the law [5]. 
Regarding the institutional framework, the level of  bureaucratiza-
tion of  exports is put into perspective. A country is said to be 
committed if  it has institutions that monitor and regulate inter-
national trade that goes through its borders. In addition, the pres-
ence of  institutions capable of  evaluating and permitting trade in 
controlled goods and entities with the capacity to enforce laws is 
critical. Besides establishing such provisions, states must demon-
strate consistency in the implementation of  their export control 
regulations.
Establishing close cooperation between and among governmen-
tal authorities and commercial sectors is also an essential require-
ment in the functioning of  the control systems [6]. In this regard, 
governments need to publicize and clarify their export control 
objectives. When implementing the export control measures, en-
suring that fairness, transparency and integrity prevail is signifi-
cant. Such factors are needed to ensure that the private sector is 
wooed into supporting the fight against illicit trade.
A high degree of  technical expertise is also a basic requirement 
in the establishment of  effective export control mechanisms [7]. 
Similarly, it is critical that tacit knowledge on design is gained. 
Based on this, staff  from implementing agencies should be 
trained on how to carry out their duties professionally. In par-
ticular, customs agents need effective training so that they can 
more easily identify illicit goods. The personnel also need to spot 
dual-use or sensitive goods. Licensing officials also need training 
on unique products. In order to attain the objective, international 
cooperation is essential. However, efforts should be directed to-
wards developing an effective local system.
UAE Export Control Framework
The UAE has the challenge of  establishing an effective export 
control system that is in line with international standards. Under 
the confederation structure of  the UAE, each of  its seven Emir-
ates has the authority to run its customs agencies autonomously 
[1]. It is only recently (2003), that the national government of  the 
UAE set up the Federal Customs Authority. Running a decen-
tralized system of  governance presents challenges that must be 
overcome when handling a national export control framework. 
The first all-inclusive law to guide the exports control system was 
established in 2007 [1]. The details of  the new provisions reflect 
an ambitious attempt by the country to strike a grip on the control 
of  exports. However, concerns arise regarding the institutionali-
zation and implementation of  the new law.
In the current section, special attention is on the legal premises, 
institutionalization and execution of  export control in UAE. It is 
noted that the UAE’s Federal Law No. 13 of  2007 sets in place a 
comprehensive set of  controls that govern exporting, re-export-
ing, transshipment and transit of  dual-use/sensitive goods across 
territories as observed by Early. The enactment also extends to 
the free trade zones of  UAE in explicit terms. The provisions also 
cover brokerage-involving transactions on restricted products and 
intangible items such as blueprints and software. The intention is 
to protect sensitive technology from proliferation and abuse. The 
law also accords Emirati authorities wide discretion on its role in 
preventing transactions that are likely to contribute to the prolif-
eration of  sensitive products.
Violations of  the above law can result in severe penalties [4]. The 
punitive measures are both criminal and administrative which en-
compass heavy fines and even jail terms. The export control leg-
islation provides a wide but technical foundation that is useful in 
controlling exports. Under the provisions of  the law, the emirate-
level agencies are required to work alongside federal ministries 
when enforcing the requirements. By extending the applicabil-
ity of  the legislation to cover the free trade zones and brokerage 
transactions on restricted goods, the law responds to the vulner-
abilities which were previously exploited by architects of  prolif-
eration. Whereas Federal Law No. 13 and subsequent legislation 
established broad foundations for controlling exports, they failed 
to address issues of  institutionalization and implementation [1]. 
Apparently, the gray areas were to be addressed by a high-level 
committee to be formed later. Given that many practical regu-
lations were not developed, the implementation of  the law was 
bound to encounter many challenges.
In 2009, the council of  ministers from the UAE launched the 
Commission on Commodities Subject Import and Export Con-
trols [6]. The composition of  the body took into consideration 
federal ministries involved in export control matters. The minis-
ter of  foreign affairs headed the commission. Given the weighty 
mandate of  institutionalizing the country’s export control, and 
developing the licensing system required to regulate trading in re-
stricted products, little progress was made in its absence. Thus 
at its inception, the expectation was that the UAE was progress-
ing on the control of  exports framework. With institutionaliza-
tion, the export control framework would signal the emergence 
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of  standard procedures and rules to oversee the management 
of  exports from the country. Although each ministry involved 
in the export business is represented in the commission, a clear 
framework does not exist to delineate the responsibilities of  the 
participants. In addition, no clear plan exists on the coordination 
of  emirate-level agencies regarding the actual control or enforce-
ment of  export controls.
Ultimately, the development of  an efficient coordination model 
among the stakeholders involved is a major challenge that must 
be overcome for the control system to work properly. Beyond the 
responsibility, the implementation commission has encountered 
concerns regarding the creation of  institutional as well as individ-
ual competencies across the various cadres of  the nation’s export 
control system [6]. Thus, those charged with the task of  regulat-
ing exports lack the capacity to do so. Thus, the UAE is obliged 
to roll out extensive training measures to enhance its capacity to 
control exports effectively.
Although the authorities at the Emirates claim that many actions 
have been launched to lower illicit trade, the enforcements have 
not followed a structured approach, but rather, they have been 
based on ad hoc responses. Citing the Wall Street Journal, Early 
indicated that officials from the country had closed forty Iranian 
entities which operated in Dubai whose activities violated the 
law [1]. UAE also claimed that it had obstructed more than ten 
proliferation-sensitive activities to Iran. In particular, Dubai had 
worked tirelessly to train its frontline staff  (custom officers) on 
how to identify and handle proliferation cases. The enforcement 
efforts demonstrate that the Emirates state is committed towards 
defeating illicit trade through the establishment of  an effective 
export control framework.
Most of  the events revolving around the law adopted by the UAE 
government have resulted from information emanating from for-
eign governments, which the GCC state enjoys cordial ties [4]. 
Nevertheless, the ad hoc approach to the enforcement of  the law 
is reflective of  the idea that the country has much to do if  it is to 
accomplish the mission of  eradicating proliferation. In particu-
lar, UAE needs to improve on its capacity to identify dual-usage 
items. Thus, the inadequacy of  the country’s institutions is an ob-
stacle in establishing an effective export control system. Creating 
a licensing institution that has the capacity to control exports and 
coordinate the enforcement of  the law would help in addressing 
the issue rather than relying on impromptu responses. For the 
UAE to be deemed an elite export control destination, it must 
consider fostering a culture of  prevention rather than punishing 
violators within its boundaries. 
Consequently, one of  the primary areas that needs urgent atten-
tion is an outreach commercial sector which is regulated by ex-
port controls. It is noted that the Emirate governments have not 
done enough to publicize export control guidelines [4]. It is also 
surprising that the translated versions of  the control provisions 
are not available publicly on the federal government’s official elec-
tronic platform. It has also emerged that the UAE has set aside 
insufficient resources to educating the commercial sector on the 
aspects of  compliance or non-compliance. It is also apparent that 
transparency is a concern given that the enforcement of  the law 
is questionable. Another issue is that the government has never 
publicized the individuals/companies that have been penalized so 
far, nor has it specified the punishments doled out. In the West, 
such as in the United States and the UK, ‘naming and shaming’ is 
a common strategy used to deter violators.
Within the UAE, firms are deemed compliant with the export 
control laws when they satisfy the following conditions as ob-
served by Horner [6]. First, organizations need to be aware of  
the country’s export control framework, each entity understands 
all requirements on compliance with UAE controls, and the an-
ticipated costs attributable to non-compliance outweigh violation 
risks. In addition, stiff  penalties and perceptions of  potential vio-
lators seem to play a role in the country’s export controls system.
Review of  Selected Articles
Within a year of  its enactment, the Federal Law was amended 
in 2008, paving the way for the Federal Law No. 12 of  2008. In 
total, 14 amendments were attached. Under Article 1, the terms 
are defined. For Articles 2-7, the general provisions are laid out. 
The next eight articles document prohibitions while the sixth ar-
ticle outlines the penalties. Articles 17 through 22 comprise the 
closing provisions. Based on the law, the offenses established are 
comprehensive and compliant with the UNSC Resolution 1540. 
Below are selected quotes from the law.
Article 2 states, “Without prejudice to the competences of  the 
authorities concerned, and with consideration to the stipulations 
of  the international agreements adhered by the State or ratified by 
it, the competent authorities shall be entitled to ban or restrict the 
importation or exportation or re-exportation of  any commodity 
or transiting or provisional shipping of  commodities, or confin-
ing all that to one official authority in the State, in instances where 
commodity constitutes a hazard to public safety or public health 
…” [8].
From the above article, it is apparent that the UAE accords state 
authorities the power to control items that enter or leave the 
country. The wide discretion borders on granting the concerned 
agencies the power to decide the commodities that pose a danger 
to the safety of  the citizens. This article has closeness with the 
‘Catch-all Controls’ in the UK which also permits authorities to 
evaluate goods and determine if  they pose a risk to the country 
[9].
It is also acknowledged that the article allows the UAE to work 
with international agencies/bodies on the fight against prolifera-
tion or sale of  dangerous items. After the ratification of  treaties 
or international agreements, such pacts are binding, and signato-
ries are expected to comply. The same applies to the UK which 
is a leading member in many international arrangements aimed 
at controlling the exportation of  dual-use or military goods. For 
instance, the subscription to the ideas of  the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment demonstrates the commitment that the UK attaches to its 
international obligations in control exports.
Article 4 states, “The competent authority shall decide on the li-
cense application for importation and exportation submitted to it 
with regard to the commodities comprised in the provisions of  
Article 2 of  this law within a period of  15 working days at most as 
from the data of  the presentation of  the application.” 
From the above article, it is apparent that the UAE, just like the 
UK, has established an agency to lead the licensing exercise of  
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entities or persons interested in engaging in trading of  sensitive 
items. In particular, dealers in sensitive or dual-use goods must 
seek approval from the relevant authorities before being granted 
the permission to handle such items. 
Shifting attention to Article 8, the law states, “Exporting or re-ex-
porting of  strategic commodities specified in the list of  strategic 
commodities is prohibited.” The article also covers publication 
and distribution of  technology deemed to be useful in the pro-
duction of  dangerous items. Another aspect that is covered under 
the article relates to the shipment of  such products. 
Article 8(2) further clarifies the issue of  exporting strategic goods. 
“No person shall be allowed to export, re-export any commodity 
not included in the attached list here to, ship it provisionally, or 
allow it to enter in transit or get out of  the State any document 
pertaining to any technology registered there on, or stored or em-
bodied therein, or publish or divulge any technology, and such in 
the following two instances: Should he be notified by the Com-
mittee that the commodities or technology will or may be used in 
whole or in part in a related activity. Should the person know that 
the commodity or technology will or may be used in whole or in 
part in a related activity.” The law directly relates to the UK laws 
on technology regulation which put stringent guidelines on the 
importation and distribution of  such items [10].
Article 15 of  the UAE law also presents significant clauses useful 
in fighting against illicit exports. The article states, "it shall be pro-
hibited for any person to publish, transfer or reveal any informa-
tion or documents related to the strategic commodities submitted 
to the Committee pursuant to the provisions of  the present  title 
unless by virtue of  a prior written approval from the President of  
the Committee, except for the following cases.
a) Where the disclosure of  the information occurs in response to 
the request of  the judicial authorities in the State.
b) In the event of  a decision issued by the Cabinet enabling a for-
eign government to investigate a foreigner in the country thereof  
or to try him for a crime committed on the territory of  the said 
state, and such under specified conditions.” 
Control Measures: International Arrangements
In a bid to control exports into the country, the UAE’s system 
has expanded considerably. For instance, the checks now include 
brokering, financial services, technology and imports. Under the 
UN’s guidelines, four attributes are reflective of  a system that has 
the capacity to reign on illicit exports [1]. The first aspect is having 
a comprehensive regulatory and legal framework. Secondly, estab-
lishing licensing practices and procedures to guide the movement 
of  dual-use items and technology is propagated. Thirdly, such 
a system must demonstrate robustness in enforcing and main-
taining integrity in the licensing system, risk detection, investiga-
tions and prosecution of  cases. Conducting industry partnerships 
and outreach awareness to promote voluntary compliance was 
deemed essential. 
In order to enhance its capacity in export controls, the UAE has 
entered deals and pacts at the international level. It is noted the 
country has ratified a range of  initiatives and treaties which in-
fluence the strategic control of  foreign trade. The pacts signed 
relate to nuclear, biological and chemical, missile, terrorism and 
proliferation [6]. Regarding terrorism, the UAE is a party to many 
initiatives such as the Container Initiative, the Security Freight Ini-
tiative, and the Megaports Initiative. On proliferation, the UAE 
is a participant in many activities aimed at countering the sup-
ply of  goods used to advance adverse engagements. For instance, 
the country has openly approved the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive. It is noted that the UAE is a member of  the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
bring together states, united against nuclear weapons develop-
ment. In ratifying of  the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
in 2000, UAE supports laws aimed at controlling the use of  chem-
ical and biological warfare. Thus, apart from the local laws, the 
UAE has domesticated international initiatives and treaties in its 
bid to contribute towards the control of  exports.
However, it is surprising that the UAE is not a party to the Aus-
tralia Group (AG) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), en-
tities focused on collating and publishing dual-use product lists 
viewed as sensitive [6]. One of  the reasons advanced to account 
for this discrepancy is that the UAE is seeking to incorporate the 
lists into its strategy before seeking membership. However, the 
country has supported the implementation of  import and export 
checks on nuclear related technology and equipment as outlined 
under the NSG policy. However, the compliance to AG require-
ments remains unclear. 
Control Lists
Licensing systems entail collation and publication of  lists of  
products that require licenses [9]. Export trade control offenses 
are thus defined based on licensing requirements breaches as doc-
umented in the items on the lists. The country of  UAE has not 
yet published a control list despite reference to a list being made 
in UAE’s export control law. Such a list is required before the full 
implementation and enforcement of  the legislation.
The delay in publishing the list remains hidden because they have 
not been publicized [1]. However, the absence might be explained 
by the indecision regarding the inclusion of  multilateral listed 
items or to consolidate and correlate them. Crucially, the lack of  
a license application platform is also a contributing factor. Indi-
rectly, it is observed that the UAE has adopted the list by the NSG 
and AG, having ratified the BTWC and the CWC. 
The fact that the law on export control was amended within a 
year of  its adoption highlights the rash nature surrounding the 
development of  the law. The intention was to control the amount 
of  pressure that was coming from the United States.
Institutional Development
Within the UAE, it is notable that the structure is highly frag-
mented as the federal and Emirates operate a decentralized sys-
tem of  governance. Every Emirate has its own distinct customs 
body which operates under the Federal Customs Authority. De-
spite all Emirates subscribing to the GCC guidelines on customs, 
reporting as well as declaration of  exports varies from one Emir-
ate to another and to the free trade zones.
Several entities also function within the Emirates in the bid to 
control exports from the UAE. The agencies are in charge issu-
ing licenses. The efforts to reign on exports dates back to 2006 
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following the formation of  the UAE Counter proliferation Task 
Force which was to participate in talks with the United States. 
After one year, the Executive Committee on Commodity Control 
Procedure was formed to oversight and manage the country’s ex-
port procedures [1]. Within a month, the Executive Committee 
on Commodity Control Procedures and the Counter proliferation 
Task Force merged with the aim of  protecting the country from 
exploitation. In 2009, the Council of  Ministers released a decree 
paving the way for the formation of  the Committee for Goods 
and Materials Subject to Import and Export Control. The body 
was to take charge of  many responsibilities such as strategic plan-
ning, coordination and cooperation, preparation of  procedures, 
and developing implementation regulations. Thus, the committee 
assumed both licensing and coordination roles.
Regarding nuclear controls, the establishment of  Federal Law No. 
6 of  2009 is illustrative of  the export environment in the UAE. 
The law relates to the use of  nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses. It also stipulates measures to be taken against violators. 
Besides, the law led to the establishment of  the Federal Authority 
for Nuclear Regulation (FANR). 
Under Article 25, FANR is responsible for the regulation of  ma-
terials entering or exiting the country. However, Law No. 13 of  
2007 supersedes such provisions since the former must be in line 
with the latter’s. Radioactive substances, nuclear fuel, and related 
material fall under this legislation.
The executive officer of  FANR has the power to issue licenses 
both for import and export. The same applies to transit and the 
transshipment of  dual-use/controlled goods [1]. The authority is 
responsible for controlling the licensing of  nuclear-related issues. 
In the UK, the issue is labeled as rating. The agency also pro-
vides rating services on items seized on the suspicion of  violating 
export controls [11]. The UAE has demonstrated its willingness 
to cooperate on stamping out the problem of  exporting harmful 
products. In particular, the UAE is concerned with activities in 
Iran regarding the shipment of  sensitive goods.
The UNSC sanctions are meant to pressure non-compliant states 
into changing their approaches. Under Article 25 of  the UN 
Charter, members of  the international body are obliged to ex-
ecute the decisions of  the UNSC [4]. Only states can carry out 
the agreements within domestic circles. The implication is that 
each country must domesticate international pacts. In practice, 
at any one given moment, it is always possible to find that some 
states have not localized international obligations. The UAE lacks 
legislation that automatically guarantees local compliance. 
The enforcement record in the UAE is mixed [4]. The assessment 
of  the country’s enforcement is fraught with limitations, leading 
to inconclusive perceptions about the state of  export controls. 
For instance, from 2006, the UAE came under pressure from the 
United States. The issue related to a container on transit to Iran 
which was suspected to be carrying aluminum sheeting originat-
ing from the US.
The Case of  the UK
Exports control is a worldwide issue given the weight the UN 
accords the subject. The UK laws on export controls are derived 
from the kingdom's international obligations and commitments 
as well as national interests. In this regard, reference is made to 
the treaties and laws that the UK has embraced.
The UK ranks as the 11th largest exporter of  merchandise glob-
ally [4]. Additionally, the kingdom is the fifth biggest importer of  
goods. Historically, the nation has led in selling arms since it was 
the 6th largest exporter of   conventional weapons based on value 
between the period between 2008 and 2012. Based on figures 
from the UK government, the country is the 2nd largest seller 
of  defense-related items and the 5th biggest exporter of  security 
products. Thus, the security and defense industries play a signifi-
cant role in driving growth as well as innovation. The sectors also 
contribute to the creation of  jobs to the country’s nationals. In-
dustry players from the UK have developed many surveillance 
applications that have been used in various parts of  the world.
The UK is involved in efforts aimed at doubling its current ex-
ports to one trillion British pounds by the year 2020. The strategy 
heavily focuses on security and defense exports. The nation has 
emphasized the expansion of  exports because it enjoys a com-
parative advantage in the field of  technology. In 2012, the defense 
exports amounted to 11 billion pounds. The figure demonstrates 
a significant increase given that in the previous year, the country 
had generated 8 billion pounds [4]. During the same period, se-
curity exports grew by four percent to settle at 3 billion pounds.
The country’s export control system has capacity given that the 
infrastructural facilities necessary are available. The platform re-
volves on UK’s high level of  security and defense exports. The 
system demonstrates robustness in terms of  legislation as well as 
enforcement. At the international level, the UK has also played a 
significant role, having led calls for global frameworks to promote 
the control of  the export of  sensitive products. For instance, the 
UK was a leading sponsor of  the Arms Trade Treaty, which it 
pushed through within the auspices of  the United Nations.
Within the UK, licensed exports of  dual-use and military goods 
are assessed based on a case-by-case merit against the criteria that 
is applied within the European Union Code of  Conduct [12]. At 
the moment, a portion of  the surveillance materials are under ex-
plicit licensing procedures. The idea that some surveillance equip-
ments are not covered raises concerns about the universality of  
the application of  the export control rules. 
International Arrangements
The UK is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  Nu-
clear Weapons. The pact is traced to 1968 when the five official 
nuclear states (USA, France, Russia, UK, and China) committed 
to restrict the transfer of  nuclear technology or weapons to other 
countries [13]. The states also pledged to avoid extending any 
form of  assistance bordering on the acquisition of  nuclear ca-
pability. Signatories to the treaty also endeavored to monitor the 
acquisition or attempts to develop nuclear weapons. 
Subsequently, the UK was among the pioneering states that ad-
vanced the adoption of  the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention in 1975 [14]. The agreement disallowed the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition, and use of  biological weap-
ons. The pact also emphasized that the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency to be allowed the powers to carry investigations into 
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suspected proliferation activities.
The other important law that was adopted was the Chemical 
Weapons Convention that came into operation in 1997 [11]. The 
agreement bars countries from possessing, developing, produc-
ing, stockpiling, acquiring and using chemical weapons. Under the 
treaty, whenever production facilities are found in unauthorized 
countries, they must be destroyed.
The UK is also a party to a number of  international regimes that 
regulate exports into the kingdom [11]. The establishments are 
critical in complementing the above legally binding treaties. The 
UK works with like-minded nations in fighting against the threat 
posed by proliferation. In this regard, reference is made to the role 
of  the UK In developing lists of  items and technology viewed as 
contributing to the proliferation problem. 
The main groups focusing on regulating exports are the Australia 
Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Zang-
ger Committee (ZC), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). The 
AG guidelines have been in operation for a number of  years. The 
procedures relate to the export of  chemicals and biological mate-
rial that can be used in the production of  harmful products. From 
1985, countries including the UK have met regularly to discuss 
chemical and biological weapons. The UK has a detailed list of  
items that are regulated under the agreement. The list is found at 
the UK Strategic Export Control Lists. In addition, the UK ap-
plies guidelines on the End-Use Control provisions. 
The Missile Technology Control Group concentrates on the regu-
lation of  rockets, missiles and related items. In particular, the re-
gime guides products intended for military use. As early as 1987, 
the UK, USA, France, Canada, Japan, Germany, and Italy reached 
an agreement to establish rules to guide the exportation of  mis-
siles and related technology [15]. Ever since, membership into the 
regime has increased significantly.
Originally, the signatories of  the regime were interested in con-
trolling the transmission of  technology or equipment that would 
contribute to the development of  cruise or ballistic missiles. Hav-
ing grown increasingly concerned about the proliferation of  uni-
dentified aerial vehicles and missiles, the group sought to extend 
its scope. Although the above agreement is not legally binding, 
the partners have voluntary committed to observe the provisions 
on exports. The pact is somewhat ambiguous given that it does 
not list any punishment on violations nor does it give details on 
enforcement. In attaining its control of  export objectives, the UK 
ties the enforcement of  the regime to guidelines on weapons of  
mass destruction end-use control or the military end-use control 
[15].
The UK is also a member of  the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which 
came into existence in 1975. At the time, the international com-
munity was concerned about the regulations surrounding the sup-
ply of  nuclear goods. In 1978, UK and members agreed to lower 
the chances of  transferring goods from one use to another [16]. 
The guidelines cover high-risk goods only. The UK has detailed 
Trigger List requirements which oversee trading in dual-use or 
sensitive items.
The Wassenaar Arrangement is also one of  the regimes that the 
UK subscribes to, in reference to controlling exports. The agree-
ment came into operation in 1996 with the objective of  increasing 
international stability and security [16]. This would be obtained 
through transparency, and acting responsibly when handling 
transfers of  sensitive goods and technologies. The UK has imple-
mented the arrangement by the enactment of  the Export Control 
Order of  2008. The controls from the Wassenaar Arrangement 
agreements have been incorporated into the Strategic Export 
Control Lists of  the UK.
The Zangger Committee was established in 1971 with the main 
objective of  interpreting the obligations of  the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear Weapons. Thus, the purpose was to 
control materials or equipment which designed and intended for 
nuclear use. The committee drew detailed lists on source or fis-
sionable material to be controlled by countries [16]. The UK has 
adopted the regulations of  the committee in its bid to coordinate 
and control the supply of  nuclear items. When export goods of  
this nature within the UK, those involved are required to observe 
the material and technology & the export of  nuclear equipment, 
popularly known as the Trigger List’ requirements. In addition 
regulations on  weapons of  mass destruction end-use control and 
military end-use control must be respected [11].
UK Export Control Framework
The statutory law regarding export control in the country is de-
rived from the European Union and UK national legislation. Ba-
sic UK legislation concerning export controls falls into the 2002 
Export Control Act. The law is subject to amendments out of  
secondary legislation as orders. The most notable alteration of  
the Act came in 2008 under the 2008 Export Control Order. The 
UK is also directly subject to UN Resolutions, international agree-
ments, and treaties although legislation rests on parliamentary 
statutory laws.
The Consolidated List of  Strategic Military and Dual-Use Items 
demand that Export Authorization show details of  specific tech-
nology, goods, or assistance being shared between or among 
states [17]. In the event that an exporter is interested in export-
ing a service/product that is found in the consolidated list of  
sensitive goods, he/she must apply for an export license. Such 
an application is assessed based on the UK policy and the con-
solidated list to determine the export criteria. It is noted that the 
consolidated list takes into consideration the export of  dual-use 
and military products, the Consolidated EU and National Arms 
Export Licensing Criteria.
The overall responsibility of  regulating exports rests with the De-
partment of  Business, Innovation and Skills. As envisaged by the 
Export Control Act 2002, the secretary of  the agency imposes 
legislation on sensitive goods. Within the department, the Export 
Control Organisation (ECO) is tasked with the responsibility of  
processing license applications, negotiating policies on export 
control on behalf  of  the kingdom, and initiating export licens-
ing laws after consulting with other departments. For instance, 
the Ministry of  Defence (MoD), the departments of  Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for In-
ternational Development can be consulted regarding license ap-
plications and technical intelligence on enforcement of  control 
guidelines. It is noted that Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs 
department is in charge of  enforcing export controls using the 
customs network to identify breaches.
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Exporters are free to apply for various licenses. Generally, the 
most distinguished issue is about the restrictions attached to li-
censes. Typically, licenses specify the type and amount of  product 
that can be exported.
The Consolidated Criteria
The United Kingdom evaluates applications concerning export-
ing items found in the Consolidated List and that approved under 
the EU Code of  Conduct [15]. As per the provisions of  the UK 
Consolidated Criteria, the likely effect of  the exports on the coun-
try’s defense and security interests, and those of  ally countries are 
to be accounted for.
Based on the UK’s Consolidated Criteria, the country’s commer-
cial and financial interests, and its association with the recipient 
country, and the consequence of  the export with reference to the 
protection of  the UK’s strategic base assume significance when 
assessing exports. 
List-based Controls
The UK Military List draws on the terms that appear on the EU 
Common Military List that is critical in defining the equipment 
covered under the EU Common Position [11]. For instance, 
countries belonging to the union (UK included) agreed to change 
the Wassenaar Munitions List in 2011. In the following year, the 
UK enforced the guidelines. The UK‘s Schedule 3 as referenced 
in Articles 2, 4 AND 5 of  the Export Control Order 2008 is 
critical in the evaluation of  Dual-Use goods. The country also has 
unilateral measures on given dual-use items. On several occasions, 
the UK has applied Article 8 drawn from the EU in assessing 
several goods such as technological and communication products. 
Under the UK Security and Human Rights List, reference is made 
to the position of  the country which disallows exports of  leg-
irons, portable electric shock appliances, gang chains and licens-
ing guidelines on items that appear on sensitive goods’ lists [11]. 
The legislative basis of  the UK draws on Article 9 of  the Export 
Control Order of  2008.
In a bid to operationalize the controls, the government of  the UK 
by-passed the EU Commission by imposing unilateral controls 
having established an individual list. For instance, the country cre-
ated the Export of  Radioactive Sources Order to reign on the 
trading of  explosives as provided for under the Export Control 
Act of  2002 [18]. The same law aligns with the expectations of  
the Schedule of  the Act. Under the latter guideline, export con-
trols can be imposed on any item if  its exportation or use has 
the capacity to undermine the country’s security or that of  other 
states. The same applies if  the goods pose a risk to regional stabil-
ity or threaten to trigger internal conflict. If  the items involved are 
weapons likely to cause mass destruction or they breach interna-
tional laws, then the law empowers the authorities to disallow ex-
portation of  such goods. The provisions also relate to terrorism/ 
crime goods or objects of  cultural value. 
The explanatory memorandum released with the Order of  2006 
reflects that the imposition of  unilateral controls was necessary 
given that the reliance on a broad policy such as the one emanat-
ing from the UK would be complex and difficult to execute. The 
UK was also seeking to allow for self-regulation and guarantee 
certainty in its operations. 
Within the UK, an export can be subjected to authorization and 
prohibition when end-use of  the item in question does not ap-
pear in the Consolidated List [18]. In the country, export controls 
bordering on end-use allow the authorities to bar exportation of  
dual-use or military goods whenever risks are involved or a po-
tential exists that the products can be used to perpetuate mass 
destruction. The rule is adopted under the guise by the UK that 
it has the right to institute all types of  control in suspicious cases. 
The laws are largely known as ‘Catch-all Controls.’ Thus, the UK 
has proactive measures that allow for the restriction of  exports 
even when the items involved do not fall into the categories of  
the listed items. The arms control and counter-proliferation di-
visions of  the UK government are in charge of  implementing 
the measures. For example, the UK Restricted Enforcement Unit 
unifies the MoD, the GCHQ, the FCO, the MI5 and the MI6 in 
bi-weekly reviews of  intelligence on exports of  the above nature.
UK Export Controls on Surveillance Technology
The UK implements measures on surveillance technology largely 
because of  its membership to the EU and the Wassenaar Dual-Use 
list established in 2011. For goods that are in the Ml11, attempts 
were being made to prevent the sale of  software that would po-
tentially be used to perpetuate warfare. Surveillance equipment is 
under the scope of  UK export controls based on the addition of  
items to the preexisting lists [10]. The authorities have the power 
to apply sanctions or use provisional measures to guard against 
trade in dangerous goods. The addition of  items into existing lists 
is done using many approaches. Given that the UK is a member 
of  many international bodies, whenever any agency reviews its 
lists, the UK is affected. Thus, changes in such international lists 
automatically lead to alterations to the UK lists. 
Under the Export Control of  2002, the UK has the ability to 
exercise emergency powers aimed at imposing restrictions issued 
at short notices. In particular, Section 6 gives authority regarding 
the imposition of  controls when the control order specifies ex-
piry dates. The power has been applied to cases involving human 
rights issues such as in 2010, when it was used in the establish-
ment of  an Order. The regulation was geared towards controlling 
lethal injections sold to the US.
Currently, the UK government does not pursue bilateral restric-
tions given that it views such arrangements as ineffective [11]. The 
country alleges that the possibility of  circumventing the agree-
ments is high. Hence, there is no need of  putting in concerted 
efforts without any guarantee of  success. On the contrary, hav-
ing agreements with entities or agencies that bring together many 
states is seen as the most appropriate. A multilateral push serves 
the interests of  export control better than bilateral ones simply 
because of  the difference in membership numbers. 
It is evident that the two countries are focused on controlling 
exports of  items viewed as sensitive. One of  the initial finding is 
that in the UAE, no lists exist while within the UK, a number of  
lists are available. Such include the Strategic Export Control List 
compiled based on the EU and UK laws. Some of  them include: 
UK Military List (Schedule 2 of  the Export Control Order 2008), 
the UK Dual-Use List (Schedule 3 of  the Export Control Order 
2008) and the UK National Security and Paramilitary List (Article 
9 of  Export).
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However, according to Maurer, Omanovic and Wagner, in the 
UK, the list-based control system is commonly used. Some of  the 
most significant lists include the UK Military List, the EU Dual-
Use List, and the EU Human Rights List. The UK Military List 
draws on items that are identified by the EU Common Military 
List which defines the goods that are covered. Changes were also 
to be effected into the list following the reviewed of  the Wasse-
naar Munitions List which was approved in 2011.
Regarding the Dual-Use List, the UK derives the goods on the ba-
sis of  Article 2, 4, and 5 of  the third Schedule of  the Export Con-
trol Order 2008. Unilateral controls also apply to the UK based 
on Article 8 of  the EU-Dual-Use Regulation and Export Control 
Order Section 3 (64). Under the section, the UK has focused on 
telecommunication equipment exports.
Concerning the EU Human Rights List, the UK relies on the EU 
Torture Regulation (66). The UK Security and Human Rights List 
captures nationally regulated items as outline under Article 7 of  
the EU Torture Regulation. The provision allows member coun-
tries to impose individual national guidelines on given equipment.
The UK also has the Export of  Radioactive Sources Order which 
was made in reference to the provisions of  the Export Control 
Act 2002 as outlined in section 1, 5 and 7. The guidelines are also 
in compliance with the subsection 1 of  the second paragraph of  
the Act’s Schedule. The latter allows the state to impose any regu-
lations on any items that threaten national security or defense.
Selected UK Orders/Articles
Within the UAE, the UAE federal law No. 13 of  2007 and No. 
12 of  2008 are the primary legislations that guide export control 
within the country. On the other hand, within the UK, the Export 
Control Act 2002, which came into force in 2004, is the main 
law regulating exports. The laws primarily apply to dual-use ad 
military items. The Export Control Act 2002 replaced the Import, 
Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 with a view to 
enhancing transparency and accountability. Since its inception, 
the Act has preceded the introduction of  secondary legislation to 
reign on exports. Just as in the case of  the UAE federal law No. 
13 of  2007, the Export Control Act 2002 has been amended to 
suit the changing environment. Among the orders that have been 
introduced previously include:
1. “Export of  Goods, Transfer of  Technology and Provision of  
Technical Assistance (Control) Order 2003 or ‘Main Order’
2. Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003
3. Trade in Controlled Goods (Embargoed Destinations) Order 
2004
4. Technical Assistance Control Regulations 2006”
The Trade in Goods (Control) Order of  2003 accords powers to 
the Secretary of  State to play a role in the regulation of  the sup-
ply and delivery of  restricted items. The third section of  the Or-
der indicates, “Subject to the provisions of  this Order, no person 
shall directly or indirectly - (a) supply or deliver; (b) agree to sup-
ply or deliver; or (c) do any act calculated to promote the supply 
or delivery of, any restricted goods, where that person knows or 
has reason to believe that his action or actions will, or may, result 
in the removal of  those goods from one third country to another 
third country.”
In section 4, the Order relates to the transfer and acquisition of  
controlled products. The law states, “Subject to the provisions of  
this Order, no person shall - (a) arrange the transfer of  controlled 
goods from one third country to another third country; or (b) ac-
quire or dispose, or agree to acquire or dispose, of  any controlled 
goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that 
such an acquisition or disposal will or may result in the removal 
of  those goods from one third country to another third country.”
The above Order also delves into the licensing issue. On the mat-
ter, the law states, “Any license granted under this Order, shall 
be in writing and may be amended, suspended or revoked by the 
Secretary of  State at any time and in such circumstances and on 
such terms as he thinks fit by serving a notice to that effect on the 
holder of  the license”. 
When reviewing the Export of  Goods, Transfer of  Technology 
and Provision of  Technical Assistance (Control) Order 2003, ref-
erence is made to Article 4. Article 4 of  the 2002 Export Con-
trol focuses on the issue of  end-use control and dual-use goods. 
Subsection one of  the article states, “Subject to the provisions of  
this Order, goods of  a description specified in Schedule 2 to this 
Order are prohibited to be exported to the destinations specified 
in that Schedule as being prohibited destinations in relation to 
those goods.”
In the present time, some orders are in place to control trade on 
dual-use and military goods. Following amendments carried out 
in 2007 and 2008, the above orders were consolidated into the 
Export Control Order. Thus, the Export Control Order 2008 is 
the major law regulating trade in strategic products, transfer of  
technology and extension of  technical help. The legislation also 
applies to trade in dual-use or sensitive goods among countries. 
Reference is also made to trade with countries subject to interna-
tional sanctions. 
Since its inception, piecemeal changes have been made with the 
aim of  updating the control lists. Additionally, the legislation puts 
checks on the export of  radioactive substances as indicated in the 
Export of  Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006.
The UK makes the following provisions based on its 2202 ACT. 
The first schedule captures dual-use and military items.
“(1)Export controls and trade controls may be imposed in rela-
tion to -
(a) military equipment;
(b) goods on which military technology is recorded or from which 
it can be derived; or
(c) goods intended, designed or adapted for use in the develop-
ment or production of  military equipment or military technol-
ogy.”
The above items demonstrate that the laws of  the two countries 
are unified in terms of  the category of  goods targeted for control. 
It is also remarked, “The Secretary of  State may by order make 
provision for or in connection with the imposition of  export and 
controls in relation to goods of  any description.” In clarifying 
the clause, the Act indicates that any goods imply pro-biting the 
regulating exportation from the UK or shipment.
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Under section 2 of  the UK Act, the focus is on transfer controls. 
The article states, that "the Secretary of  State may by order make 
provision for or in connection with the imposition of  transfer 
controls in relation to technology of  any description.” The provi-
sion further clarifies that no individual from the UK can handle 
proscribed technology transfer from the country to another des-
tination and vice versa. In describing technology, the Act states 
that, “Technology may be described in the order wholly or partly 
by reference to the uses to which it may be put.”
The third section is on the issue of  technical assistance. Subsec-
tion 4 of  the Act indicates, “The power to impose technical assis-
tance controls shall only be exercised for the purpose of  imposing 
controls corresponding to or connected with any export controls 
or transfer controls”. Thus the implication is that controlling 
technical assistance which falls into the technology category is a 
matter of  interest to both countries.
Article 8 of  the Dual-Use Regulation permits extending controls 
to non-listed items. The justification for the unlimited nature of  
the provision is meant to secure the country. In particular, internal 
security and human rights considerations are major points consid-
ered by the country.
The UK is bound by the decisions on exports control as a mem-
ber of  the European Union. In particular, the EU Restrictive 
Measures on surveillance and monitoring applies to the country. 
Reference to sanction and embargo regimes by the EU assume 
significance when reviewing the UK. Such measures are imple-
mented as per the directions of  the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy platform. 
The UK has also embraced the Torture Regulations as advanced 
by the EU. Regulation No. 1236/2005 focuses on restrictions on 
trading in specific goods whose use can perpetuate torture, capital 
punishment, or cruel treatment. Imposed behind the backdrop of  
the European Union law, the regulation applies to all members of  
the union, and requires them to review items listed to be under 
control continuously.
Recommendation
In order to increase the chances of  realizing the expectations of  
export controls, patience will be required in the case of  the UAE 
since establishing an effective system takes time. Hence the Com-
modities Subject to Import and Export Controls needs to take a 
deliberate approach to achieve the objectives that associated with 
the measures it is undertaking currently. The country should con-
sider developing new regulations, processes and reinforce its com-
petences on the administration and implementation of  export 
control regulations. Given that the regulatory regime is relatively 
new, patience is necessary. Although it is possible to make steady 
progress, taking an incremental approach would be the most ap-
propriate approach given the prevailing circumstances. The au-
thorities should also avoid working to the whims of  western pow-
ers because the development of  export controls should take into 
account the long-term goals of  the country.
It is apparent that the UAE would benefit from importing the re-
quired expertise to control exports. However suing indigenization 
would also be helpful. The authorities should ask international 
bodies or developed states such as the US to provide support 
to the local agencies regarding the fight against trade in sensitive 
items.
Observations
In summary, the following observations have been made. The is-
sue of  discretion has also emerged as a common aspect of  the 
countries’ laws. Article 2 of  Federal Law No. 12 of  2008 allows 
the authorities wide discretionary power. Based on the article, the 
UAE accords state authorities the power to control items entering 
or exiting the country. The article is closely related to the ‘Catch-
all Controls’ in the UK which also grants authorities the power 
to assess goods and determine if  they pose a risk to the country 
before taking appropriate action.
It also emerges that besides establishing national laws to oversee 
export control in the countries, efforts have been made to work 
with other nations. This is achieved by taking part in entities that 
bring together a number of  countries to fight illicit trade. In this 
regard, reference is made to the number of  international arrange-
ments that the two countries are part of. The UAE has ratified an 
array of  initiatives and treaties which influence trade in strategic 
commodities. It has signed pacts on nuclear, biological and chemi-
cal, missile, terrorism and proliferation. Furthermore, the country 
has also ratified deals regarding terrorism. The UAE is a signatory 
of  the Container Initiative, the Security Freight Initiative, and the 
Megaports Initiative. The country has also approved the Prolif-
eration Security Initiative. Besides, the UAE is a member of  the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty, which bring together states, arrangements bringing 
together states against nuclear weapons proliferation. 
From the paper, it is also noted that the UK takes part in a num-
ber of  international initiatives with the intention of  controlling 
exports. For instance, the UK is a leading member of  the Was-
senaar Arrangement. Other arrangements include the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, among others. However, the UAE is not a member of  
the Australia Group (AG) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 
This contrasts with the UK, which is an active member in both 
bodies. 
Control lists are integral to the fight against illegal exports. The 
UAE does not have a list while the UK has a number of  such lists. 
Hence, the UAE has ground to cover towards succeeding on the 
fight against proliferation.
The two countries laws capture the issue of  radioactive substanc-
es too. For the UAE, reference is made to Article 25, which ac-
cords FANR the responsibility of  regulating materials entering or 
exiting the country. The legislation also extends to nuclear fuel, 
and related materials. In a bid to operationalize the controls, the 
UK imposes unilateral controls having established an individual 
list based on the Export of  Radioactive Sources Order to as en-
visaged under the Export Control Act of  2002.
Conclusion
Export controls can prove effective as tools of  protecting the 
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world from abuses that emerge from trading on sensitive or dan-
gerous products. Given that the world landscape keeps changing, 
the export control system also needs to be changed in order to 
keep pace with the developments. Updating the export control 
system would be a major step in enhancing the control platform. 
Adopting sound implementation policies would also be important 
in improving the effectiveness of  export control systems. Such 
frameworks need to include well-defined evaluations criteria, re-
porting and enforcement requirements.
From the comparison, it is evident that the frameworks are also 
broad. Hence, narrowing them down would be important in en-
hancing their effectiveness. In practice, a wide reference model is 
difficult to implement owing to the complexities that accompany 
them. As argued in the case of  the UK, entering multilateral ar-
rangements provides a platform that is more likely to lead to a 
positive outcome in the pursuit of  export controls. As opposed 
to unilateral or bilateral decisions, multilateral arrangements enjoy 
the support of  many players, hence are more likely to attain bet-
ter results.
The wider security and defense sectors need to engage in develop-
ing more effective export controls. This would provide clarity and 
ensure that deceptive actors do not gain control of  the industry. 
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